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Abstract
The paper proposes a novel cognitive architecture (CA) for computational
creativity based on the Psi model and on the mechanisms inspired by dual
process theories of reasoning and rationality. In recent years, many cognitive
models have focused on dual process theories to better describe and imple-
ment complex cognitive skills in artificial agents, but creativity has been
approached only at a descriptive level. In previous works we have described
various modules of the cognitive architecture that allows a robot to execute
creative paintings. By means of dual process theories we refine some relevant
mechanisms to obtain artworks, and in particular we explain details about
the resolution level of the CA dealing with different strategies of access to
the Long Term Memory (LTM) and managing the interaction between S1
and S2 processes of the dual process theory. The creative process involves
both divergent and convergent processes in either implicit or explicit manner.
This leads to four activities (exploratory, reflective, tacit, and analytic) that,
triggered by urges and motivations, generate creative acts. These creative
acts exploit both the LTM and the WM in order to make novel substitutions
to a perceived image by properly mixing parts of pictures coming from differ-
ent domains. The paper highlights the role of the interaction between S1 and
S2 processes, modulated by the resolution level, which focuses the attention
of the creative agent by broadening or narrowing the exploration of novel
solutions, or even drawing the solution from a set of already made associa-
tions. An example of artificial painter is described in some experimentations
by using a robotic platform.
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1. Introduction
Cognitive architectures (CA) are inspired by functional mechanisms of
human brain, and the various models proposed [29] try to define the neces-
sary modules to emulate the complex interactions among perception, mem-
ory, learning, planning, and action execution. These modules influence the
external behaviours of agents and their interactions with humans.
Among the many high-level cognitive abilities, creativity could be the
one that allows to investigate new solutions or improvements for cognitive
architectures for various reasons. Creativity, in fact, is a component of human
intelligence that cannot ignore external influence, given that its mechanisms
of association, analogy, and composition strongly depend on some evaluation
processes [10].
To provide a definition of ’what is creativity’ is as difficult as for the
definition of ’intelligence’, and it is easier to focus on the final product of
the creative process. Various attempts were made to formalize the artifi-
cial creativity (named also computational creativity) [14] [28] and to define
methodologies and establish metrics of creativity [25]. In particular, the re-
search area on computational creativity focuses on computational systems
capable to create artifacts and ideas, and it heavily relies on both internal
and external system evaluations. Computational creativity research is then
focused on the creation of an outcome, or a process, with a certain degree of
innovation and invention, and capable of arousing emotions.
Many proposals have been presented in order to tackle the problem of
computational creativity. For example, a cognitive model for creativity has
been proposed in [24] with the aim of explaining the cognitive transformations
that occur as the creative process is triggered and proceeds. In this model, af-
ter an initial, intuitive, phase which triggers an information retrieval process
from memory, there is an analytical phase characterizing a focused form of
thought which analyzes relationships of cause and effect. Two key points of
this model are the variable focus of attention and the associative memory. In
particular, the variable focus of attention, while pointing the basic idea, also
collects other concepts that are parts of the stream of thought. Furthermore,
by means of associations between different concepts and completion mech-
anisms, new and surprising results can emerge [11]. This kind of creative
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process can be bound to the process that Boden calls combinatorial creativ-
ity which is related to making unusual combinations, either consciously or
unconsciously generated, of familiar ideas [9].
Cognitive architectures allow software to deal with problems that require
contributions from both cognitive science and robotics, in order to achieve so-
cial behaviours which are typical of the human being. Currently, CA have had
little impact on real-world applications and a limited influence in robotics.
Their aim and long-term goal is the detailed definition of the Artificial Gen-
eral Intelligence (AGI) [30], i.e. the construction of artificial systems that
have a skill level equal to humans in generic scenarios. Despite their current
underutilization they represent, in our opinion, a possible general frame-
work for the integration and analysis of creative computational processes in
cognitive agents. As a matter of fact, CA represent the infrastructure of
an intelligent system that manages, through appropriate knowledge repre-
sentation, the process of perception, recognition, categorization, reasoning,
planning and decision-making [38]. It is a great open challenge to be able to
integrate into the CA all the aspects relating to language, emotions, abstract
thought, creativity and so on; and the main difficulties are due to the man-
agement of the internal representation of the external world, and the ability
to efficiently update these models through the interaction with the outside
world.
In a general perspective, the mental capabilities [55] of artificial com-
putational agents can be directly introduced into a cognitive architecture
or emerge from the interaction of its components. In this respect, many ap-
proaches have been presented in the literature, ranging from cognitive testing
of theoretical models of the human mind, to robotic architectures based on
perceptual-motor components and purely reactive behaviours [29][38] [12].
Various available cognitive architectures present some mechanisms of self-
evaluation that can enable the comparison of expected results with the one
obtained. However, as mentioned, in order to introduce creativity modules
which can truly affect the creative process [27] of a cognitive agent, it is
necessary to capture external evaluation (e.g. feedbacks from users).
Jordanous [34] indicates 14 key components to take into account in order
to deal with computational creativity, and some of them could be partially
considered in various components of a CA: dealing with uncertainty, inten-
tion and emotional involvement, generation of results, domain competence,
originality, social interaction and communication, variety, divergence and ex-
perimentation, value, evaluation. Other factors are more difficult to manage,
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requiring more investigation and better definition for real implementation:
active involvement and persistence, general intellectual ability, progression
and development, spontaneity and subconscious processing, independence and
freedom, (abstract) thinking. Being capable to tackle at least some of these
parameters can lead to realise an embodied artificial agent able to interact
with humans and the environment, capable to produce a creative processes
or creative acts trough a given cognitive architecture.
Along with these considerations, in previous works [3] we presented the
possibility of embedding some mechanisms of computational creativity [9]
[13] within cognitive architectures [29][38]. We identified some features that
have been exploited by a robot, capable of developing his own artificial visual
perception, and originating a creative act based both on its experience and
expertise, and through interaction with the human.
As a consequence, we explored the features of the Psi model [7][6] and
its architecture, since it explicitly involves the concepts of emotion and mo-
tivation in cognitive processes, which are two important factors in creativity
processes. In particular, we focused our approach on the MicroPsi [6] ar-
chitecture, which is an integrative architecture based on the Psi model that
has been tested on some practical control applications. It has also been used
on simulated artificial agents in a simple virtual world. The MicroPsi agent
architecture is interesting since it describes the interaction of emotion, mo-
tivation and cognition of situated agents based on the Psi theory of Dietrich
Do¨rner. [5][6]. MicroPsi consists of several main components, which are con-
nected to their environment by a set of somatic parameters (named urges)
and external sensors. The activity of the agent consists of a number of inter-
nal and external behavior modules. While the former are “mental” actions,
the latter send sequences of actuator commands to the environment.
Recently, the dual process theories of mind ([50], [20], [35]) have sug-
gested that our cognition is governed by two types of interacting cognitive
systems, which are called respectively system(s) 1 and system(s) 2. Systems
of the type 1, referred also as S1, operate with rapid, automatic, associative
processes of reasoning. They are phylogenetically older and execute pro-
cesses in a parallel and fast way. Type 2 systems, referred also as S2, are,
on the other hand, phylogenetically more recent and are based on conscious,
controlled, sequential processes (also called type 2 processes) and on logic-
based rule following. As a consequence, if compared to system 1, system 2
processes are slower and cognitively more demanding. In the dual process
perspective, then, decision making consists in a two-step procedure based on
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the interaction between heuristic, perception-guided (and biased) thinking
(type 1 processes), with forms of deliberative thinking based on the canons
of normative rationality (and on type 2 processes).
In the area of computational creativity, despite initial attempts have been
made to point out, at the descriptive level, the importance of the compat-
ibility between such perspective and its implementation in a cognitive ar-
chitecture involved in computational creativity task [53], at the best of our
knowledge, there is not yet an existing implementation of an artificial system
integrating a dual process account of computational creativity.
In this paper we illustrate the evolution of the approach aimed at sup-
porting the execution of an artificial digital painter [3][4], which is based on
the MicroPsi model. This evolution exploits the dual process theory to em-
ulate creative processes. As in [2][4], the proposed approach is based on a
multilayer mechanism that implements an associative memory based on Self
Organizing Maps (SOMs) [37] and it is capable to properly mix elements
belonging to different domains.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section discusses the dual
process theory and its application in the field of computational creativity,
the third section proposes a computational creative system based on the PSI
cognitive architecture and implementing the Dual Process theory, the fourth
section illustrates some experimental results and final artworks, then in the
last section conclusions are given.
2. Dual Process Approach and Computational Creativity
In recent years, the cognitive modelling community have posed a growing
attention on the dual process theories as a framework for modelling artificial
cognition “beyond the rational” in the sense intended by Kennedy et al. [36].
In this line, different attempts have been made to introduce the tenets
of the dual process models in the computational arena. Efforts have been
made, for example, in the areas of knowledge representation and reasoning
[22] [41], cognitive systems dealing with arithmetical calculations [51], action
selection [21], cognitive models of emotions [39], question answering [40] and
in the design of general purpose cognitive architectures, such as CLARION,
whose principles are explicitly inspired by such a theoretical framework [52].
A first theoretical attempt to apply the dual process theory in the field
of computational modeling has been developed by Sloman [45] by adopting
the Smolensky connectionist framework [47] to describe the computational
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differences between system 1 and system 2. Interestingly, Sloman described
the relationship between the two systems as parallel-competitive in nature,
differently from the traditional default-interventionist approach, according to
which the deliberative S2 reasoning processes work as logical controller and
can inhibit the potentially biased responses of the S1 systems and replace
them with correct outputs based on reflective reasoning (see ([20]). More
recently, also a revised version of the dual process theory, based on the hy-
pothesis that the system 2 is divided in two further levels, respectively called
“algorithmic” and “reflective” have also found a computational counterpart
in the area of biologically inspired simulation of emotions emergence [39].
Interestingly, the dual process approach has been considered plausibly
applicable also in the area of creativity research [48]. Creative thinking lit-
erature, in fact, distinguishes between two sets of processes: those involved
in the generation of ideas, and those involved with their refinement, evalua-
tion and/or selection. In addition, in this area, theoretical and experimental
frameworks have been developed suggesting that, in human beings, the real-
isation of creative artefacts (either tangible or intangible) involves the inter-
action between the two types of reasoning processes hypothesised by the dual
process approach [48]. Such a perspective, then, seems to be also plausibly
applicable to the design of novel models of computational creativity.
Nevertheless, reducing thinking processes as a straightforward dichotomy
between two systems is judged to be too simplistic by many authors (see for
example [50] and [26] ). As a matter of fact, the key question is how the two
systems interact. According to Sowden et al [48], the manner in which S1 and
S2 cooperate influences the differences in creative capabilities arising both
between individuals and across time with respect to the same individual.
Guilford, [31] discriminated thinking processes as being divergent or con-
vergent. The operation of these two processes can be seen as a precursor of
the dual process model of creative thinking. Divergent processes are usually
referred as being associative, while convergent processes are referred as being
more analytic.
Nonetheless, in the literature it has been claimed that a straightforward
mapping of divergent thinking onto S1 and convergent thinking onto S2 is
too na¨ıve, since divergent processes can be also the result of an associative
course, but they can also be the result of a deliberative process, as well as
convergent processes can be also unconscious.
This has led to the definition of disparate models of creativity, many of
which related to different dual-process models. For example, Basadur et al.
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[8] distinguish between three major stages in the creative thinking process:
a) problem finding, b) problem solving, and c) solution implementation, by
realizing a process that involves ideation-evaluation cycles. In this view, the
creative thinking process is seen as a problem solving task thus involving
different phases (this idea goes back to [44], and [1]). Nijstad et al (2010)
[43], proposed a dual process theory which states that creativity can arise
through two pathways: a flexibility pathway and a persistence pathway.
Many authors agree on the importance of both generative and evaluative
processes and on the prominence of the interaction between them during
creative thinking. As a consequence, the most promising approach is to rely
on an integrated dual-process model of creativity which takes into account
the different interaction mechanisms involving both S1 and S2 systems as
well as both the generative and evaluative processes.
An interesting theoretical model for the design of creativity-enhancing
interfaces has been described in [54]. It is based on a two stage model of
creativity described by Guilford, which characterises the creative process as
a combination of “convergent” and “divergent” thinking, and the dual process
theory. The model is referred to as “four quadrant model”. It analyses the
process by which a set of features parameters is changed to achieve a creative
result (navigation of a finite parameter space).
In the following we introduce the adopted rationale for the integration of
a creative module inspired to the four quadrant model in the PSI cognitive
architecture.
According to this model, both S1 (implicit processing), and S2 (explicit
processing) may: i) conduct convergent or divergent strategies ii) generate
new ideas (new solution to a problem) and iii) converge to the more appro-
priate solution as illustrated in figure 1.
S1 can generate new ideas (EXP quadrant) by means of associative, com-
binatorial or transformational processes that can be therefore evaluated by
S2 through an analytic strategy (AN quadrant), but it can also perform a
Tacit strategy to converge to the more appropriate solution, using knowl-
edge formed in the past to quickly access default “previous best” behaviour
(TAC quadrant). Moreover S2 can perform a divergent, reflective strategy to
intentionally generate very distant points in solution space (REF quadrant).
The interactions among the the four quadrants can contribute to the
generation of creative solutions, but that can have inhibition effects, as dis-
cussed in [54]. In the figure we have highlighted the interactions involved in
the creative process proposed in our system.
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We believe that the application of the four quadrant model can be use-
ful to extend the creative capabilities of existing artificial creative systems
towards a more realistic and cognitively grounded scenario.
Figure 1: Four quadrants model [54]. We have highlighted only the interactions involved
in the creative process proposed in our system.
3. Cognitive architecture
The proposed cognitive architecture is inspired to the PSI model [5]: we
have made small modifications to some functions and processes blocks to
the original PSI model in order to implement the S1-S2 model and its four
quadrant interpretation (fig. 1). A creative process arises from a set of
interactions highlighted by bold arrows in fig. 1 involving S1 and S2 systems
operating in both convergent and divergent processes. Such interactions can
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be described in terms of a dual theory model, iterating between divergent
and convergent thinking, and embracing all the four kinds of processes. Each
process is labelled according to the associated kind of system: for example a
S1 system operating a divergent process is executing an “Exploratory” task.
The creative process starts if the agent has an adequate motivation. It is
inspired by the perceptions of the agent (perception module), and it is carried
out through phases of exploration, evaluation and, if necessary, reflection
and re-planning. These stages require access to the LTM and the working
memory of the agent and different cognitive processes. The resolution level
modulates the analysis of the perceptions, the access to the memory and
the activation of the different cognitive processes. The creative process leads
to the imagination of an artwork. However the mental representation of an
artwork does not suffice to the creative process. As a matter of fact the
imagined artwork must be physically realized in order to explicate ideas in a
tangible manner.
In the next section we describe the modules that are mainly involved in
the creation of an artwork, the evolution of the creative process and the influ-
ence of the evaluation on the artist, while the other parts of the architecture
related to the physical execution of the artwork will not be discussed since
they are beyond the scope of this paper and for this reason they are shaded
in the figure.
3.1. Resolution Level
In the original description of the PSI model, the Resolution Level block
operates both as a modulator working on the encoded percept (output of
the sensing phase) and as communication module with the LTM. In our per-
spective the resolution level can additionally control the S1 process outputs
towards S2 processes.
The resolution level is correlated in an inverse proportion with an ac-
tivation parameter, which in turn is influenced by the urges of the artist
[5].
The creative process starts when there is an adequate level of motivation,
which leads to a value of Activation that motivates the artistic production.
It is aimed to the achievement of a creative goal, like realizing an artwork.
The resolution level takes part of the process when the system looks for an
inspiration arising from its perceptions. A high level of Activation leads to
a reduction of the resolution level. This could also lead to a speed up of the
cognitive process since less details have to be taken into account. On the
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Figure 2: The PSI architecture. The shaded blocks are not relevant for the current
description of the dual process based creative path. The labels on each block refers to fig.
1 and indicate the role of each block during the creative process.
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contrary, a lower level of Activation leads to a higher value of resolution, re-
quiring a deeper analysis of the details [5]. In particular, the resolution level
directly influences an exploratory parameter, which determines the distance
from the cluster center of the working memory SOM (described in the next
section) to consider different possible replacements of image regions. Fur-
thermore, the resolution level controls also how much detailed should be the
check of the result obtained by the S1 process from the S2 system.
The perceptive module output (the source of inspiration) triggers the cre-
ativity process and the beginning of the exploratory process. The resolution
level (RL) controls the activation of both S1 processes (tacit (TAC) and ex-
ploratory (EXP) in figure 2). For the exploration process, RL may decide
to broaden or narrow the exploration regions, according to the urges that
indirectly influence the RL. For what concerns the activation of the tacit
processes, RL may lead to the retrieval of default (e.g. previously learned)
associations in the LTM. The unification of different types of S1 strategies
follows the rationale introduced in [41] based on the assumption that different
types of autonomous S1 processes need to be introduced and integrated in a
cognitive architecture aiming at being a realistic model of human cognition.
RL also controls the interaction between the Tacit Processes (TAC) and the
Analytic ones (AN) during the S2 checking of the results of the exploration
process. The Resolution Level is also involved when a change of association
domain is needed in order to try to satisfy the internal model of the agent
w.r.t an internal model of the desired output. This mechanism is considered
as being reflective (REF).
3.2. LTM and working memory
During the training phase the system learns and properly organizes its
knowledge about artistic notions and the main execution techniques into the
Long Term Memory (LTM). The term Long Term Memory (LTM) refers to a
memory space that stores information for a long time-span (even a lifetime).
This memory is recognized in all cognitive theoretical views [16]. In our work
the LTM is an associative memory that stores whole images or image details
or features useful for a creative process involving artwork or image creation.
This knowledge is aimed at representing image features clustered by subject.
Information in this memory is organized in domains, were each domain stores
information on objects of the same kind.
These image details are recalled by means of an association with the
sensory input, or other memorized images and even with a conceptual repre-
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sentation (or internal representation) of the artwork involved in the creative
process. The associative mechanism implies that the tasks involved can be
tacit or exploratory as shown in fig.2.
In the presented architecture the LTM is constituted by a set of associative
memory modules, each of them implementing a Domain: each Domain is a
set of image features belonging to specific kind, like flowers, animals and so
on. Input from sensors are sent to the proper domain at the first level and
they are memorised or completed when necessary as explained below. The
second level contains the associations among different domains that will be
further explained in the following and are related to the working memory.
The associative memory modules that we propose are inspired by the
work reported in [42] and are implemented using Self Organising Map (SOM)
neural networks [37]. Details on this architecture can be found [3].
Self Organising Maps are neural networks constituted by a single layer of
neural units usually organised in a 2D grid. After a successful training phase
each neural unit ideally approximates the centroid of an input pattern cluster
and the neighbour units represent similar values. This way each neural unit
corresponds to a sort of average pattern for a cluster of inputs.
In the proposed architecture we also need a memory area for the artwork
execution. The Working Memory (WM) can effectively identify this memory
area used by the running processes. In this memory the pieces of information
are stored for a short or medium time-span. In some cognitive theories
this memory is not separated from the so-called Short Term Memory [16].
In our model the WM is used to temporarily store the associations among
separated domains. These associations come from the similarity of two pieces
of information in separated domains. The WM is built by using a large SOM
that clusters all the image details and features in all the Domains. This will
enable the substitution and exploration mechanism that is in the background
of the creative process under consideration.
The information coming from the domain modules is represented in the
Working Memory by using more general features. For example, if a domain
is used to memorise images of trees and one of the SOM in the array of a
Domain module memorises the shape of the leafs, the SOM in the working
memory can use the dimension of the bounding box1 as a feature. When we
want to mix together objects from other domains we can consider objects
1the bounding box is the rectangle surrounding an image detail
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that have the same bounding box. The substitution will be driven by the
second level SOM whose aim is to link the different domains by clustering
the pieces of images memorised in the long term memory. A substitution
according to the bounding box dimensions is a simple criterion but a more
general set of features could also be employed.
The WM SOM implements the spreading of the focus of attention since
it mixes objects from different domains and group them just considering
very rough characteristics. This module is used when the attention focus
is relaxed and it is necessary to retrieve different objects and ideas. When
completion is obtained by using “parts” or memories that are outside of the
domain of the original image, or input, we are making an association that is
not casual. This can happen when the recalled part is used to obtain memory
contents from other, different domains. In this case, the associations are the
ones memorised in the WM SOM, associations that involve two features of a
different kind.
In fig. 3 it is sketched the whole process: the missing part is recalled as
said before however, in this case, it is not sent to the output but it is sent to
the WM SOM where it is used for recalling objects from different domains.
The recovered information is used as a reference in order to obtain the
missing part that is sent to the second level SOM. This signal excites a unit
of the WM SOM and its output is sent back to all the associative memory
of the other domains. Each domain answers with a list of the excited units
that point out to a set of signal corresponding to the memorised objects. As
indicated in fig 3 all these objects are proposed as substitution of the missing
part. At this point the completion proposed from the original domain is
again used as a reference: all the proposed substitution are compared to the
original completion and the most similar one is chosen as a substitute.
3.3. Evolution of the creative thinking
In the following, we show some examples of the system by explaining the
cognitive flow.
First of all, we hypothesize that the artificial agent has some pre-defined
tasks and domains. When motivations and urges determine the activation of
the task make a portrait by association Tpa, the sensing module, the planning
module, the resolution level, LTM, and STM are involved in a complex path
of thinking that switches from S1 to S2 processes and vice-versa.
The domain faces Dfaces is pre-associated to task Tpa, but another do-
main needs to be chosen to have creative association mechanism. The agent
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Figure 3: The completion procedure outside the domain.
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Figure 4: Example of possible candidates for replacement by association
takes inspiration by sensing its environment in order to choose a relevant
domain: it looks for known objects, colors, and detect facial expressions of
people ([33]). This phase triggers the exploratory thinking (implicit diver-
gent process EXP in figure 1) searching possible associations between two
domains. For example, in the case of the Arcimboldo painting style ([4]), the
flowers domain Dflowers could be used to explore creative associations with
Dfaces. The exploration is also guided by tacit, implicit-convergent thinking
TAC, and derives from a training process performed by analytic process (AN
quadrant).
Figure 4 shows an example of possible replacements by faces/flowers as-
sociation mechanism. Four image regions extracted from original face image
activate the hub-som clusters indicated in the figure. The element corre-
sponding to the cluster centroids could be chosen for substitution, however
we can set an exploratory parameter depending on distance from the cluster
center to allow the system to consider other replacements.
Analytic component AN also monitors the mental execution of the art-
work using the chosen association. The monitoring algorithm is part of the
preparation phase that arises from reflective thinking. In the case of faces-
flowers association, for example we use a face recognition algorithm that
checks the presence of a recognizable face in the result of the substitution
by association process in the mental image of the artwork (see example in
5). Other relevant features are RGB, CIE L*a*b*, HSV histograms, and two
different texture representations (see section 4).
When the replacement is accomplished, the S2 system, performs a check
of the result obtained by the S1 process. The check is performed by means
of an analytic strategy. In the specific case, the analytic strategy relies on a
face detection algorithm which checks the presence of a face. Let us suppose
that the result is the one shown in the left side of figure 5, in this case the
check returns a positive result and the system can execute its artefact. If
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Figure 5: A face detection algorithm checks the presence of a recognizable face. The left
side of the figure shows a positive check, while the right side shows a result not valid for
the artwork creation
the check is negative, as in the case shown on the right side of figure 5, this
leads to a reflective strategy. According to the reflective strategy the system
can trigger another explorative strategy, or can relax or modify the checking
function used in the analytic strategy.
The reflective strategy is implemented by means of a set of rules in or-
der to make the best decision according to the specific situation (the result
obtained by the analytic strategy).
When the model of the painting is ready, the planning module starts the
physical execution of the artwork. Analytic monitoring (AN) based on S2
processes, compares the product of execution to the internal model, and uses
another internal evaluation function that realizes the internal expectation (a
discussion about the creative process as an iteration between the conceptual
representation and the final form could be found in [17]).
For example, the internal model of the artwork could use a large set of
colors (see example in fig.6 on the right), but in the execution phase the agent
can use only few colors (see fig. 6 on the middle) or a shape of paintbrush
different from a dot (see fig. 6 on the left). In the first case, the agent
could accept the difference from its ideal model, but the second one could be
rejected causing a replanning of artwork execution or creation.
Moreover an external evaluation judges [4] the results of the whole creative
process and causes, when necessary, modification of the execution planning.
Failures, i.e. unsatisfactory results measured by internal and external eval-
uation functions, may determine the modification of evaluation parameters
in allowed ranges, or modification of execution mechanisms, or the change
of domains for associations, or, in the final instance, the relinquishment to
perform the task. Figure 7 describes the above explained creative process as
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Figure 6: Different execution means can influence the creative results and even cause the
replanning of the artwork creation
an activity diagram to better understand the switching between S1 and S2
processes that leads to artwork creation. In this diagram, the two evaluation
phases are quite evident (indicated as diamond shapes), and they could ac-
tivate a rearrangement of execution strategy by means of the REF process,
or determine domain or task changing as previously stated.
The advantage of framing the architecture in a dual process model is
mainly that one of having a “transparent” description of the processes that
occur, with the possibility of varying parameters such as the tendency to ex-
plore, the tendency to reflect, and so on. One possible objective to pursue in
future work, might be to test different versions of agents focused (with vary-
ing degree) on some interactions (eg. agent A focused mainly on reflective
thinking, Agent B on creative “exploration”, and so on). Their behaviours
and products could correspond to different creative styles. Basically, it could
strengthen or inhibit the activation of some processes, and analysing if this
makes a difference in the output. This opportunity of enhancing or inhibit-
ing is possible thanks to the explicit description and representation of these
processes in the model. In case of different results (which seems the most
potentially interesting outcome) it would be interesting to do an analysis of
the different types of output and trying to understand what are the processes
17
Figure 7: Activity diagram of the creative thinking process
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that led to different behaviours.
3.4. Motivation of the artist
The motivation parameter is the element that activates the creative pro-
cess and influences the execution planning. This parameter is changed through
an evaluation process (both internal and external). In fact, a good evaluation
of the artworks and the receiving of gratifications from the public increases
the motivation of the artist. At the same time, the motivation increases when
the artist, undertaking a difficult activity, obtains a valuable result (with re-
spect to his expectations). The consequence is that it experiences a great
satisfaction, feeling some sort of competence.
External and internal evaluation have a very important role determining
the urges of the artist and, consequently, his motivation. In particular, the
evaluation influences Competence and Certainty, and with the other urges
it determines the motivation of the agent. Competence is defined by Go-
ertzel ([12]) as the effectiveness of the agent at fulfilling its needs. Certainty
is defined by Goertzel ([12])as the confidence of the agent’s knowledge. In
the specific case of a creative agent, we can define the Competence as the
effectiveness at fulfilling correctly a set of creative acts, while the Certainty
depends on the amount of styles judged as of pleasant used by the agent.
Here we focus on the cognitive urges, which influence what we call artistic
motivation or creative needs.
During the execution of the artwork the artificial artist compares what is
produced and the expectations with respect to its internal model. If the ex-
pectation of the agent is disregarded, and the outcome of an action does not
reach the goal, something in the mechanism should be changed. Instead, a
correct accomplishment of a technique allows the agent to achieve a positive
evaluation, with the consequence that the value of his competence increases,
and consequently his motivation. Therefore in our model, the internal eval-
uation affects the value of the Competence urge in MicroPsi.
The external evaluation regards a post-production evaluation of the art-
works and it is obtained asking a set of users to express their judgements.
Every time an user expresses a judgement about an artwork, his opinion has
an impact on the execution techniques used to produce that result. Therefore,
the external evaluation affects the Certainty of the agent and consequently
influences the motivation of the artist. The values of Competence and Cer-
tainty determine a particular degree of the artist’s evolution. As an example,
a beginner is an artist having both low Competence and Certainty, while an
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artist that has both high Certainty and Competence is an acclaimed artist.
Different combinations of these values could be referred to other interesting
states of the artist, and could lead the artist to reconsider its choices, by
means of a reflective strategy.
4. Experimental details and final results
In this section we highlight some relevant details on the experimental
process.
The input of the process is the image perceived by the visual sensors and
“inspires” the system triggering the creative task. Not all the parameters
are known a priori; many of them are related to the current status of the
system. As a consequence, the output generated by the system is different
according the status of its own at the beginning of the process; furthermore,
the creative process depends also on the ongoing output. Here we point
out the process leading from the perception of a face to the creation of an
Arcimboldo like artwork.
The face domain is processed with an alternative domain that is cho-
sen according the particular inclination of the system (considered the past
experiences). A particular case is shown where the agent deals with the
flower domain. The selection of the domains has been described in previous
paragraphs.
The images and characteristics of the flowers are used to substitute and
replace portions of the image. They are taken from an initial inspiration,
or they are used to compose a whole artwork where the parts are given by
previous constraints. They are chosen according a final desired output as
shown in Figure 3.
The manner in which the flower patches are used to replace pieces of
faces is realised through the hierarchical process illustrated in section 3.2.
The result is the substitution of part of the initial image with patches that
are as similar as possible to the original regions to substitute.
The similarity is evaluated by mapping portion of image on SOMs dealing
with the specific domain taking into account the information regarding color
and texture. The color information is evaluated according histograms based
on a representation in color space while for texture, spatial frequency and
pattern detecting features are considered.
For each image five different features are extracted. Three of them are
referred to color information and two of them to texture information. For
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color information, the representation of visual data in three different color
space is taken into account. The color space are RGB, CIE L*a*b* and HSV.
The RGB features are derived from the histograms of the spectral compo-
nents or red, green and blue. The model is based on a Cartesian coordinate
system and the color space can be represented as a cube where each point
correspond to a given color. To represent color content a vectorization is
adopted. To each channels are associated ten bins that are used to store the
color data for a given range of values. The same representation is used for
all the three channels. The RGB representation is the typical representation
of color images so the feature extraction is straightforward. other chromatic
space are also used to capture multiple aspects of the chromatic perception.
The RGB color space is connected with the perceptive capability of the
human visual system that is mainly sensitive towards these three channels.
The HSV space is used to have a representation that is more similar to the
way humans describe colors and are suitable for natural language interpre-
tation. When we describe an object we use the concepts of hue, saturation
and brightness. Hue is a color property that describes a pure color (pure red,
pure yellow and so on...). Saturation gives a measure of the degree to which
the pure color is diluted with white color. Value is bound to a subjective
descriptor that is difficult to describe. It embodies the achromatic notion
of intensity and is one of the key factors in the description of the color sen-
sation. This model has the further advantage to split the color information
(hue, saturation) from the intensity information that is very similar to the
gray scale representation of a given image. Also in this case ten bins are
chosen for each channel. They are used to store how many pixels fall in a
given range of values. Concatenating the histograms for the three channels
is obtained a representation for the global color information [46].
The CIE L*a*b* color space is a representation conceived to include all
the perceivable colors, which means that its gamut exceeds those of the RGB
and CMYK color models . One of the most important properties of the
L*a*b* model is that it is device independent. It means that the colors
are defined independently from their generation and from the device they
are displayed on. The value of L represents the lightness of the color that
ranges from black to white. The a* value represents the color in the axis
that represents the red to green line. The negative a* values are referred to
green while the positive values of a* values are referred to red. The b* value
represents the color along the yellow to blue variation. Negative b* values
correspond to blue while positive b* values correspond to yellow[32].
21
For the texture information we characterize the image according two fea-
tures that are given by Gabor Filters and Haar Filters. The Gabor Filters
are filters that capture frequency and orientation of the visual patterns [23].
In the spatial domain, a 2D Gabor filter is a Gaussian kernel function modu-
lated by a sinusoidal plane wave. The filters capture the presence of patterns
with different orientation and scales. The orientations are given by the di-
rection of the sinusoidal wave while the scale is bound to the values of the
sigma parameter of the Gaussian function. The transformations produce a
multi-channel representation driven by orientation and scale in line with the
Daugman theory that Human Visual System elaborates set of image filtered
with narrow orientation channels ([19]). The energy associated to each filter
is represented through a value so considering four values of the sigma pa-
rameter and three values for the direction is obtained a vector with twelve
elements The Haar filters are formed by a set of bidimensional square shaped
functions that form a wavelet family of a basis. They can be seen as a special
case of Debauchies wavelets [18]. The response to each filter is given by the
integral of the grayscale image in a square shared region subtracted by the
integral of the image in the complement of the given region. The shape and
the number of subcomponent of the region are bound to the complexity of
the pattern that is detected. The key advantage of a Haar-like feature over
most other features is its calculation speed. Due to the use of integral images,
a Haar-like feature of any size can be calculated in constant time. For the
considered representation we have taken into account twelve regions from the
simplest to more complex, to capture different shape of patterns and with a
global dimensionality that is equal to Gabor filter descriptors.
In figure 8 (reported at the end of the paper) some example of the obtained
results arising from the creative process are reported.
5. Conclusions and future works
We have presented a cognitive architecture aimed at computational cre-
ativity by exploiting a dual process approach. In particular, the architecture,
based on a microPsi cognitive model, has been embedded into an artificial
digital painter. The creative process involves both divergent and convergent
processes in either implicit or explicit manner. This leads, according to the
four quadrant model, to four activities (exploratory, reflective, tacit, and
analytic) that, triggered by urges and motivations, generate creative acts.
These creative acts exploit both the LTM and the WM in order to make
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novel substitutions to a perceived image by properly mixing parts of pictures
coming from different domains, that are already stored in the memory of the
agent. In the paper we have highlighted the role of the interaction between
S1 and S2, modulated by the resolution level, which focuses the attention of
the agent by broadening or narrowing the exploration of novel solutions, or
even drawing the solution from a set of already made associations.
In the near future we plan to extend the evaluation of our system by
increasing both the complexity of the task to be solved (i.e. by adding
additional artistic domains that can be potentially chosen by the agent) and
by comparing our BICA-based system with not biologically-inspired ones
solving the same problem with different strategies (by using, for example,
random selection choices or rule-based mechanisms).
Our expectation is that, in the final evaluation performed by human
“judges”, the “creativity” choices of our system, given its cognitive ground-
ing, should be rated higher w.r.t. that ones provided by artificial systems
adopting standard decision procedures.
As above mentioned, one of the next steps of the current research will
be that one of investigating the creative output of the artificial agent by
adopting different creative styles in different scenarios (e.g. the “explorator”
agent can be compared with the “analytical” one and so on).
In this perspective, we also plan to investigate the adaptability of the
present model w.r.t. the novel Stanovitch’s tripartite framework [49]. Such a
framework belongs to the “dual-process theories” family of cognitive models
and differs from other dual-process theories in its description of System 2. In
particular: processes usually ascribed to System 2 are assumed to belong to
two types of systems, respectively called the “Algorithmic Mind”, responsible
for cognitive control, and the “Reflective Mind”, responsible for deliberative
processes.
According to Stanovitch, the division of human cognition into three sets
of processes, instead of the traditional two of dual-process theories, provides
a better account of individual cognitive differences (e.g. individual difference
with regard Algorithmic Mind processes are linked to cognitive abilities and
fluid intelligence, while Reflective Mind differences are observed in critical
thinking skills). Since we aim at precisely investigating in which way the
output produced by different types of creative agents depends from their in-
dividual creative style, the analysis of the compatibility between the proposed
dual process based model of computational creativity (in its 4 quadrant in-
terpretation) and this new theoretical framework seems to be promising and,
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in our opinion, deserves further investigation.
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